A new method ofcryptologic attack on binary sequences is given, using their linear complexities relative to odd prime numbers. We show that, relative to a particular prime number p, the linear complexity of a binary geometric sequence is low. It is also shown that the prime p can be determined with high probability by a randomized algorithm if a number of bits much smaller than the linear complexity is known. This determination is made by exploiting the imbalance in the number of zeros and ones in the sequences in question, and uses a new statistical measure, the partial imbalance.
I. Introduction
In several applications in modern communication systems, periodic binary sequences are employed that must be difficult for an adversary to determine when a short partial sequence (that is, a subset consisting of consecutive elements of the sequence) is known, and must be easy to generate given a secret key. This is true both in stream cipher systems, in which the binary sequence is used as a pseudoone-time-pad [16] , and in secure spread spectrum systems, in which the sequence is used to spread a signal over a large range of frequencies [14] . While theorists have long argued that such security can only be achieved by sequences satisfying a very general statistical test such as Yao's [17] and Blum and Micali's [2] next bit test, practitioners are often satisfied to find sequences that have large linear * This project was sponsored by the National Security Agency under Grant No. MDA904-91-H-0012. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute rep/ints notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon. complexities, thus ensuring resistance to attack by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [12] . Linear feedback shift registers are devices that can easily generate sequences with exponentially larger period than the size of their seeds [5] , though with small linear complexity. Thus, much effort has gone into finding ways of modifying linear feedback shift registers, typically by adding some nonlinearity, so that the sequences they generate have large linear complexities.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to argue that high linear complexity is inadequate for security, even when the only concern is with attacks using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. To this end, we exhibit binary sequences, i.e., sequences of elements of the field GF(2), with high linear complexity, but which have low linear complexity when considered as sequences (whose elements happen to be only zero or one) over a larger finite field. Our second purpose is to demonstrate that a particular class of sequences, geometric sequences based on m-sequences over fields of odd characteristic, are insecure for stream cipher systems. We do so by first proving that, for a particular prime p, these sequences have low linear complexity when considered as sequences over GF(p) , and then giving an algorithm which inputs a relatively small partial sequence and determines p with high probability (the probabilities are over the set of partial sequences of a fixed size). This is made possible by the fact that these sequences are imbalanced.
In Section 2 we recall the definitions of linear complexity and geometric sequences, and some of the basic results concerning them. In Section 3 we derive an upper bound for the linear complexity of the geometric sequences in question. In Section 4 we exhibit an algorithm for finding the characteristic of the field of definition for tb ,~ m-sequence on which a geometric sequence is based. This algorithm is based on computing the partial imbalance of a sequence (the imbalance of a partial sequence). Its success depends on bounding the variance of the partial imbalance. This is a similar approach to one taken in an earlier paper by the author and Mark Goresky based on the partial period autocorrelation [9] , but requires far fewer bits for success.
Definitions
A sequence S = (Si) over a field F is linearly recurrent if it satisfies a recurrence of length n,
with ci E F not all zero. The linear complexity of S over F is the smallest n such that S satisfies a linear recurrence of length n. Equivalently, the linear complexity of S is the length of the smallest linear feedback shift register over F which generates S. We denote the linear complexity of S over F by 2r(S). It is well known [12] that 22r(S) consecutive elements of S suffice to determine the smallest linear recurrence satisfied by S (or, equivalently, to synthesize a linear feedback shift register which generates S). Moreover, the algorithm for this determination is highly efficient. Thus, for purposes of security, sequences must be found which have large linear complexity. Now consider a binary sequence S. While it is perhaps most natural to think of S as a sequence of elements of GF (2) , and thus concern ourselves only with the linear complexity over GF(2), we can in fact think of S as a sequence over any prime field GF(p). When S is a binary sequence, we denote the linear complexity of S over GF(p) by 2p(S). It is our purpose to show that, despite the fact that 22(S) is large, 2p(S) may be small for some computable p. This is not the case for all sequences. For example, the sequence 0 n-110 "-11... has 2p(S) = n for all p. Of course this sequence has other undesirable properties such as a lack of balance.
The sequences we consider are known as geomtric sequences and have been considered by several authors with respect to their linear complexity and correlation properties [31 [41 [6] , [7] , [8] , [18] . In particular, Chan and Games showed that, for q odd, geometric sequences can have high linear complexities (over GF(2)) [4] . For this reason, these sequences are candidates for applications that require easily generated sequences that resist chosen plaintext attacks. Geometric sequences are based on algebra over finite fields, and we recall first some of the basic concepts. See Lidl and Niederreiter's [10] or McEliece's book [13] for a more detailed treatment of finite fields.
Let p be a prime integer, let q = pe be a fixed power of p, and let GF(q) denote the Galois field with q elements. For any n > 1, we denote the trace function from GF(q") to GF(q) by Try", defined by Let ~ be a primitive element of GF(q"), that is, GF(q") consists of zero and the powers of ~t. The infinite periodic sequence U whose ith term is Us = Tr~n(ct i) is known as an m-sequence over GF(q) of span n [10] . More generally, we can consider the sequence whose ith term is Tr'~"(Act ~) for some fixed element A of GF(qn). This amounts to a cyclic shift of the sequence U, so we do not consider it to be a distinct sequence here. It is well known that every m-sequence of span n can be generated by a linear feedback shift register of length n over GF(q). It has period q" -1, the maximum possible period for a sequence generated by a linear feedback shift register of length n over GF(q). Moreover, every such maximal period sequence is (a shift of) an m-sequence [10, pp. 394-410].
Definition 2.1. Let n be a positive integer and let ct be a primitive element of GF(qn). Let g be a (possibly nonlinear) function from GF(q) to GF (2) . The binary sequence S whose ith term is
S i = g(Tr~"(o~i))
is called the geometric sequence based on the primitive element ct and feedforward function g.
Note that if p is odd, then in general a function from a field of odd characteristic to a field of characteristic two cannot be defined algebraically. We can, however, think ofg as simply dividing GF(q) into two subsets (or as the characteristic function of a subset of GF(q). Alternatively, we can think ofg as a function into {0, 1 } c GF(r) for any prime integer r. If r = p, then g(x) can be expressed as a polynomial in x with coefficients in GF(q).
The geometric sequence S is easy to generate if the feedforward function g is easy to compute. This is always the case, for example, if q is small. Such a geometric sequence is a binary sequence of period dividing q" -1. Geometric sequences with q odd have been used in applications where easily generated sequences with large linear complexities are needed, due to the following theorem of Chan and Games 1 '4] , in which we let v = (q" -1)/(q -1). 
2~(S) = v2~(T).
Thus, if 9 is chosen to maximize 22(T) at q -1, then 22(S) will be q" -1, i.e., maximal. It is straightforward to generalize this theorem to the linear complexity 2r over an arbitrary prime number r ~ p. The details are left to the reader. In particular, as long as 9(x) ~ 0 for some x ~ GF(q), then 2r(S) > (q" -I)/(q -1) for all primes r # p. Thus the only prime over which S can have small linear complexity is p, and we show in the next section that this is indeed the case.
Bounding 2p
In this section we show that if S a geometric sequence based on an m-sequence over a finite field of characteristic p, then 2~(S) is far from maximal. Our results follow from the work by Zierler and Mills [18] , Herlestam [61, I7"1, and Brynielsson 1'3] on the linear complexity of algebraic combinations of periodic sequences over fields. What amounts to a special case of these results was proved by MacWilliams and Mann [11] and Smith 1'15"1 in the context of measuring the rank of the incidence matrix of points and hyperplanes in a finite geometry.
Preliminaries
If F is a field, then the set of infinite sequences over F is an algebra, with addition and multiplication defined componentwise. The set of polynomials in one variable t with coefficients in F acts on infinite sequences over F, with t acting as the shift operator:
Moreover, this is an F-linear action of the algebra of polynomials with coefficients in F on the vector space of infinite sequences over F. The condition in (1) is equivalent to f(t)S = 0, where f(t) = ~7=o ci ti. Iffs(t) is the smallest degree nonzero polynomial such that fs(t)S = 0, and g(t) is another polynomial such that g(t)S = 0, then fs(t) divides g(t). The polynomial fs is known variously as the connection or feedback polynomial of S. Its degree is 2r(S).
The following is a consequence of the work of Zierler and Mills [18] . Iff and g are polynomials over F, let f v g be the monic polynomial whose roots are the distinct elements of the form ~di where ~ is a root off and ~ is a root of g (over an algebraic closure of F). By Galois theory, f v # is defined over F. 
c.m, off s andfr, and 2r(S + T) < At(S) + 2r(T)./ffs andfr have no common roots, then fs+r = fsfr and 2r(S + T) = At(S) + 2r(T). (2) fsr divides fs v fr and At(ST) < 2r(S)Ar(T) = the number of distinct root products ~6, ~ a root off s, 6 a root of ft. If all the root products from fs and .IT are distinct, then fsT = fs v fr and 2r(ST) = 2r(S)2r(T).
We also need the following well-known lemma. 
Geometric Sequences
In our situation we have an m-sequence U of period qn _ 1 over GF(q), hence of linear complexity n over GF (q) . To this sequence we apply a feedforward function g: GF(q) -, GF(q). For now g is arbitrary, but we eventually specialize to the case where the image of g is in {0, 1}. We can express g as a polynomial
with a~ e GF(q) (recall q = pC). The resulting sequence S can be thought of as a sum of constant multiples of powers of the original sequence U. Herlestam i7] derived a formula for the linear complexity of such sequences in the case where g contains a single term. He also gave formulas relating the linear complexities of sequences to the linear complexities of their sums and products. However, he stopped short of considering a fully general feedforward function g applied to an m-sequence, and this is our situation. We use the results of the preceding subsection to express the linear complexity of S in terms of p, e, n, and {at}. Note that the connection polynomial fo of U is the minimal polynomial of ct over GF(q), and at is a primitive element of GF(qn). Hence fu has distinct roots Proof. We find 2p(S) and the roots offs for g(x) = x k in four steps. 1. Suppose g(x) = x p'. The minimal length recurrence for S is the minimal length recurrence for U with its coefficients raised to the p~th power. Thus fs is fu with its coefficients raised to the pith power. Therefore 2p(S) = n and fs has roots
2. Suppose g(x)= x bp', where 1 < b < p. Then S is a b-fold product of the sequence in the preceding case with itself. By Proposition 3.1(2), the set of roots of fs is a subset of the set of b-fold products of elements ~P'qJ, 0 _< j < n. Not all root products are distinct, so we cannot simply apply Proposition 3.1(2) to get 2p(S) precisely. Nonetheless, 4. In the general case, S is a sum of sequences of the form considered in the previous case. Due to the uniqueness of base p representations, and the constraints on {ri.j}, all roots of all the connection polynomials of the summands are distinct. The theorem follows from Proposition 3.1 (1) .
[]
Proof. In general, if S is a sequence over a field F, and F is a subfield of E, then the linear complexity of S over F equals its linear complexity over E. To see this, observe that any linear recurrence over F is also a linear recurrence over E, so the linear complexity over E is at most the linear complexity over F. On the other hand, there is a basis for E over F containing 1. Any linear recurrence over E produces one over F by expressing the coefficients in such a basis and considering the component of 1 in all expressions.
Corollary 3.5. The linear complexity of S (over GF(q) or GF(p)) is at most
Proof. The maximum occurs when all a~ are nonzero. In that case the linear complexity is k=O i=O ,
To see the last equality, we show by induction on t that, for any t and n,
When t = 0 both sides equal 1. Suppose (4) is true for t replaced by t -1. Then 
It follows that 2~(S) is maximized by taking e = r and n = 1. Unfortunately, this means that the feedforward function # completely defines the sequences, and is defined on an enormous set (of size equal to the period). We have done away with the m-sequence and have an arbitrary binary sequence of period p' -1.
A more typical use of geometric sequences is to divide the computational work evenly between g and the m-sequence by choosing n approximately equal to q = pC.
Then we can generate a sequence of period qP -1 with a relatively easily defined feedforward function on q elements and a q stage linear feedback shift register over GF(q). We must take care, however, that g(x) cannot be written as g(x) = h(Tr~(x)) for some f dividing e and h: GF(p ~) ~ {0, 1}. With relatively small q we can obtain sequences of enormous period that are easily generated. The maximum linear complexity we can achieve with such a sequence is This expression will be largest if e is small. Thus choosing q to be a larger prime rather than a power of a small prime will give a larger linear complexity. For example, with p = 3 and q = 27, we will have a sequence of period approximately 1.4 x 2 t28, while the largest linear complexity we can achieve is less than 226. For p = 5 and q = 25, the period is approximately 1.1 x 2 t 16, while the linear complexity is less than 1.1 x 229. On the other hand, if p = q = 17, the period is only 1.4 x 269, but the linear complexity can be made greater than 23~ Even for the latter sequence, however, if bits are generated at the rate of one bit per microsecond, then enough bits to crack the sequence are generated in approximately 1 hour.
We might just as well map {0, 1} to an arbitrary pair of elements of GF(p) to consider binary sequences as sequences over GF(p). Let a: {0, 1} ~ GF(p) be an arbitrary one-to-one function. We denote by tr(S) the result of applying a to each term of the binary sequence S. By observing that, for any a ~ b ~ GF(p), there is a linear transformation of GF(p) mapping (0, 1) onto (a, b), we see 
Finding p
The fact that 2p(S) is low is of no use to a cryptanalyst unless p is known. In this section we describe an algorithm that determines p with high probability. We actually determine q with high probability. For purposes of cryptanalysis, however, we only need p.
It was recently shown that, for a geometric sequence S based on an m-sequence over GF(q), q can be determined with high probability if at least 2q s bits of S are known [9] . This attack is based on the calculation of a partial period autocorrelation function. More available bits give a higher probability of success.
We show that, in fact, the same information can be obtained with far fewer bits of the sequence available--approximately q4 bits--using a simpler statistical measure, the partial imbalance (the imbalance of a sequence is the difference between the number of zeros and the number of ones).
An attack on a system using geometric sequences proceeds in two stages. First, use the partial imbalance to determine q (with high probability). Knowing q tells us p, and this then allows us to use the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to synthesize a linear feedback shift register over GF(p) that generates S. The number of bits needed for this last stage to work is determined by the linear complexity calculation in Section 3.
Suppose a small partial sequence of S of length D is known. We show that the imbalance of the partial sequence is close to D/q when q is odd. More specifically, we show that, for odd q, the expected imbalance (letting the starting point of the partial sequence vary and keeping the size of the partial sequence fixed) is approximately D/q, and that the variance is sufficiently small that the partial imbalance is close to its expectation with high probability (this is a consequence of Chebyshev's inequality [1] ). One way to view our results is that we have introduced a new statistical test that a sequence must satisfy in order to be secure--the variance of the partial imbalance must be high for small partial sequences if the imbalance is high. To simplify notation, we sometimes transform sequences of O's and l's into sequences of + l's and -l's. In the case of geometric sequences, we write G(x) = (-1) g~x~ to accomplish this. 
The Imbalance and Partial Imbalance

The imbalance of a function 9: GF(q) ~ GF(2) is
Jg= 6(x)
x 9 GF(q)
Thus we have [] If q is even, then the feedforward function g can be chosen so that ~ = 0. It follows that Js = + 1, and we can learn nothing about S by computing its imbalance. If, however, q is odd, then the smallest imbalance of 0 that we can achieve is + 1. In this case we have Js = +q.-1 + 1.
Proposition 4.2. The imbalance of a geometric sequence S of period q" -1 with feedforward function 0: GF(q) ~ GF(2) is
Thus for such a sequence we can hope to determine q.-t if we can compute is. Such a computation is, unfortunately, hopeless--we would need to know the entire sequence S to compute Js. We can ask, however, how much can be learned about a sequence if only a partial sequence is known. This leads to the following definition. If an adversary to a stream cipher system knows D consecutive bits of a sequence, then she can compute a partial imbalance with window size D. The start position k will be unknown to the adversary. If the partial imbalance is sufficiently well behaved for small enough windows and varying k, then the adversary can get useful information. It is hopeless to expect a precise expression for the partial imbalance. We show, however, that the expected partial imbalance (averaged over the starting position of the window) is closely related to the full imbalance. We also show that for certain window sizes the variance of the partial imbalance (with fixed window size D, but varying start position k) is low enough that an adversary has high probability of discovering q. This is a consequence of Chebyshev's inequality [1] which implies that a bound on the variance implies a bound on the probability that a particular partial imbalance is far from the expected partial imbalance.
We begin by showing that the expected partial imbalance of any sequence can be determined from its full imbalance. We denote the expectation of a random variable X by E IX]. All expectations are taken for fixed window size D, assuming a uniform distribution on all start positions k. []
In the case of interest, we have
Corollary 4.5. Suppose S is a geometric sequence based on an m-sequence of span n with elements in GF(q), with feedforward function g: GF(q) -~ GF(2). Assume that S is as balanced as possible, i.e., IJgl-< 1. Then the expected partial imbalance of S is if q is odd, and if q is even.
El-is(k, D)] - D(+_q ~-1 +_ 1) qn 1 D E [Js(k, D)] = _ qn _ 1
The Algorithm
If q is even, then the expected partial imbalance is too small to hope to recover useful information. If q is odd, then the expected partial imbalance is approximately D/q, and we can hope to learn q from it. If the partial imbalances (for varying k) lie close to the expected partial imbalance, then we can compute a partial imbalance (with q and k unknown), determine which expected partial imbalance D(+q n-I + 1)/(q n -1) the result lies closest to, and conclude that q was used to generate the sequence. That is, we use the following algorithm:
Algorithm for Finding q. 4 . Find q such that I xl~ u~.
Output q.
Is this algorithm likely to be successful? Only if we can choose disjoint intervals U s so that Js(k, D) is in U~ with high probability whenever q was used as the parameter for generating S. If we can sow that the partial imbalances do not deviate too much from their expectations, then it will be possible to choose the intervals U~. Chebyshev's inequality bounds the deviation of a random variable from its expectation in terms of its variance.
Proposition 4.6 (Chebyshev's Inequality [1]). If X is a random variable with expectation E[X] and variance V(X), then, for any e > O, v(x)
Prob{IX-E[X]I > e} < e~ As it turns out, the algorithm needs at least q4 bits for success, more than are available if n < 4, so we assume n _> 4. If q is an odd prime power, then, for n >4,
The interval Uq should contain all these points. For each odd q, we pick a positive real number eq, such that
We then let U s be the interval from D(q 3 -1)/(q 4 -1) -eq to D(q 3 + 1)/(q 4 -1) + eq. If we can choose the eq so that V(Js(k, D)) < 89 2 gq whenever S is a geometric sequence of period q" -1 based on a feedforward function 9: GF(q) ~ GF (2) , and n _> 4, then Chebyshev's inequality can be applied to show that the algorithm is successful with probability at least 1/2. In the next section we show that this is the case if enough bits are available, i.e., if D is large enough. Moreover, both V (Js(k, D) ) and e~ will be proportional to D, so the more bits that are available, the higher the probability of success.
The Variance of the Partial Imbalance
We next consider the variance of the partial imbalance. This section consists of a proof of the following bound, which implies, for example, that 2q 4 bits of a geometric sequence with balanced feedforward function and odd q are sufficient to determine q with probability at least 1/2. The probability of success goes up if more bits of S are known. We let v = (q" -1)/(q -1).
Theorem 4.7. For any z, if D <_ v, then the variance of the partial imbalance of a geometric sequence with window D is bounded above by D.
Proof. Recall that the variance of a random variable X is defined to be
2, so we must determine the second moment E[Js(k, D) 2] of the partial imbalance. We can reduce this determination to the determination of the cardinalities of certain sets, as stated in the following proposition. By identifying GF(q") with n-dimensional affine space over GF(q), these sets are identified with intersections of hyperplanes. If s e GF(q), and A e GF(q"), then we denote by H) the hyperplane {x: Tr~"(Ax) = s}.
Proposition 4.8.
where
ProoL
If S is a geometric sequence, then ---N~,i(s, t)G(s)G(t) -1 ,
N,,j(s, t) = I/~, n H~,I. 
Choosing the Intervals
In this section we describe how the intervals Uq can be chosen so that the results of the previous section, combined with Chebyshev's inequality, imply that the algorithm for finding q is successful with high probability. We assume q is odd and that g is as balanced as possible (that is, JI = -1). This makes the sequence as statistically random as possible.
As explained in Section 4.2, we find a positive number e~ for each odd q. It would suffice to do so for each odd prime power q. However, to avoid the difficulty of recognizing prime powers, we simply do so for each odd number. In any case, in the sequence of odd prime powers there will be consecutive odd numbers--e.g., 25 and 27--so the worst-case complexity cannot be improved by restricting q to be an odd prime power. Proof. The first assertion is straightforward. The second assertion holds because, as was shown in Section 4.2,
for the geometric sequences in question.
We can now combine this with Chebyshev's inequality and our results on the variance of the partial imbalance to obtain the following theorem. (qn _ 1)/(q -1) will succeed with probability at least
Proof. is(k, D) is in Uq. We have
(by the definition of eq).
The probability that the algorithm is successful is the probability that [] If n = 5 and q < 5, or if n = 4 this probability will be negative for all D, so Chebyshev's inequality does not tell us whether the attack has a positive probability of determining q. However, we have Corollary 4.12. If n = 5 and q >_ 7, or n >_ 6, then using a window of size (q,I. __ 1)2 D>--(q2 __ 3)2
gives a positive probability of successfully determining q.
For example, if q = 27, then 535,841 bits suffice to determine q with positive probability. Of course we want to determine q with high probability. (1 --t$)(q 2 --3) 2.
For example, if q = 27 and n > 6, then we can determine q with probability at least 1/2 if 1,071,682 bits are known, a relatively small number.
Conclusions
Perhaps the most important aspect of this paper is the consideration, for a binary sequence, of linear complexity relative to an odd prime number. We have demonstrated that this linear complexity can be far smaller than the period of the sequence, even when the usual linear complexity is quite large. This can be exploited in a cryptologic attack. The belief that high linear complexity gives a degree of security is fallacious. At the very least, the linear complexity must be high relative to all small primes.
We have shown that geometric sequences based on m-sequences over a finite field GF(q) of odd characteristic p can be cracked if enough bits are known. By finding upper bounds on the linear complexity relative to p we show that these sequences are vulnerable to a Berlekamp-Massey type attack. The number of bits required depends on the parameters of the sequence (not simply the period). If geometric sequences of this type continue to be used, this dependence and considerations of efficiency should influence the choice of parameters. It seems that it is best to choose p fairly large and generate a sequence of period pP -1. This gives an easily generated sequence with linear complexity relative to p as large as possible for geometric sequences with approximately this period.
We have also shown that if p is not known, then it can be discovered with high probability if enough bits are known. The algorithm for determining p exploits the lack of balance in geometric sequences and uses a new statistical measure, the partial imbalance. In general, far fewer bits are required to determine p than are required for the Berlekamp-Massey attack. For example, if we use a geometric sequence S based on an m-sequence of span 17 over GF(I7), so n = p = q = 17, then 217(S) is approximately 1.l x 23~ The period of the sequence is approximately 1.4 x 269. Thus with 2.2 x 230 bits available we can determine p with probability at least 1 -2 -14, and then determine a linear feedback shift register over GF(17) that outputs S. The drawback is that if 217(S) is close to 23~ then this feedback register will have span close to 230 and will generate the sequence much more slowly than the original device using comparable hardware. It is an interesting question whether the information we have acquired can be used to synthesize a faster device for generating the sequence--such as the original device.
It is, of course, dangerous to rely on linear complexity as a measure of cryptographic security. There are many other statistical tests a sequence must pass--in this paper we have shown that the linear complexity relative to primes other than two must be high and the variance of the partial imbalance must be high if the imbalance is large.
